Undermining the Mine Ban Treaty
In January 1997, photographers captured Diana, Princess of Wales walking through minefields on a trip to Angola with the International Red Cross. A passionate humanitarian, Diana brought international attention to the civilian harm caused by landmines. Her championing of the anti-mine movement, along with the staunch advocacy efforts of numerous NGOs, led to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (“Mine Ban Treaty,” “MBT,” or “Ottawa Convention”), an international treaty that established an international anti-personnel mine prohibition.
A landmark humanitarian disarmament treaty, the Mine Ban Treaty is the first arms control agreement to ban a weapon that was widely used at the time of its adoption. On December 9, 1997, the United Nations General Assembly approved resolution 52/38A and adopted the Ottawa Convention. While the MBT is widely ratified and has attained the status of customary international law, the treaty fails to account for the recent proliferation of technologically advanced “smart” mines that states have used to carve out exceptions to the treaty. The Mine Ban Treaty should be re-evaluated and amended if its normative framework is to withstand the far-reaching impact of these technological developments.
State parties to the Mine Ban Treaty agree to never use, develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, retain, or transfer anti-personnel mines. Article 2.1 of the MBT defines an anti-personnel mine as a mine “designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons.” The MBT required that state parties commit to destroy mine stockpiles, clear all mined areas within their jurisdiction, and assist victims of mine explosions.
The Mine Ban Treaty established a total prohibition on APMs to facilitate widespread internalization of the anti-mine norm and stigmatize the use of APMs in conflict. The treaty was constructed deliberately lacking strong enforcement mechanisms, opting instead to rely on self-reporting, peer-to-peer accountability, and civil society oversight to maintain compliance. In doing so, the treaty developed a strong norm that has successfully deterred state parties and states that have not yet acceded to the treaty from using anti-personnel mines through a system of mutual accountability, public transparency, and vigilant civil society oversight. Since the treaty’s adoption, there has been a significant reduction in deaths caused by landmines, from 25,000 annually in 1999 to fewer than 5,000 in 2022.
Self-destructing smart mines threaten to destabilize the international norm against APMs. The proliferation of smart mines runs counter to the intent behind the MBT, which is grounded in a humanitarian interest to prevent civilian harm from mines. Smart mines pose dangers to civilians and the environment just as their conventional counterparts do: smart mines are indiscriminately scattered or can fail to self-destruct, causing significant casualties.
States that have not yet acceded to the treaty use characteristics of smart mines to justify continuing to produce, deploy, and transmit mines instead of working toward eliminating mine usage and eventually acceding to the treaty. The U.S., which is not a party to the MBT, continues to use command-detonated Claymore anti-personnel mines. Despite their injurious and lethal effects, Claymore mines are technically permissible under the MBT if they are not victim-activated, but their usage violates the norm against mine use that the treaty relies upon for its efficacy. Similarly, in 2016, the U.S. Army initiated the Gator Landmine Replacement Program to develop a wireless network of remotely detonated mines that can be triggered on command.
Other major powers have attempted to produce technologically sophisticated mines that satisfy the principle of distinction to maintain the appearance of adhering to the norm against anti-personnel mine use and international humanitarian law (IHL). Russian forces have deployed POM-3 fragmentation mines in Ukraine. POM-3 mines are sophisticated and lethal APMs equipped with seismic sensors that can detect human footsteps, triggering the mine to expel shrapnel. Russia has made uncredible claims that POM-3 mines use AI to distinguish between civilians and soldiers to avoid facing consequences for violating IHL.
States should reassess the Mine Ban Treaty if it is to maintain its efficacy amidst the rapid development of self-detonating smart mines. State parties should adopt a broader definition of APM that would extend the mine prohibition to encompass smart mine technologies. The amendment would initiate a gradual shift to expand the norm against anti-personnel mines to protect civilians from the lethal effects of evolving mine technologies. Even though the MBT has been successful in its efforts to deter antipersonnel mine use, any efforts to broaden the scope of the anti-mine norm would encounter strong resistance from the U.S. and Russia because it is in these states’ interests to continue deploying smart mines in conflict.
The Mine Ban Treaty has successfully contributed to the evolution of an international norm against the use of anti-personnel mines. Yet, technological advancements in warfare threaten to undermine the normative foundations of the MBT. To ensure that the influence of the Mine Ban Treaty is not diminished, state parties should expand the scope of the treaty to preserve the normative force of the treaty against technologically advanced weapons that pose the greatest threat to the world.
